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ABSTRACT 
Accidental gas explosions are a recognised hazard in process industries but they are also common in 
residential buildings. Whilst process plants have specifically designed vent reliefs to limit the 
enclosure damage, in homes a similar effect is achieved due to the presence of doors and windows 
whose failure often protects the building. There are empirically based correlations for predicting 
overpressure and for vent sizing, however these are limited in application to simple enclosures. In 
practice, enclosures have interconnected spaces which would potentially increase the flame 
acceleration considerably. In this paper we present the results of full scale natural gas layer tests in a 
twin chamber, which consisted of two 22 m3 enclosures connected by an open doorway. Layered 
natural gas/air mixtures of 8, 10 and 12% by volume, were ignited at the rear of one of the chambers. 
Explosion relief was provided by vent openings of 2.48, 1.49 or 0.74 m2 on the far walls of both 
chambers. With tests with equal large vents on each of the chambers, the dominant influence was the 
external explosion. The maximum overpressure was produced by tests involving a 12% natural gas 
concentration. The use of a smaller vent in the adjoining enclosure had a significant effect on the 
maximum overpressure and the mechanism of the explosion development. However, altering the size 
from 1.49 m2 to 0.74 m2 had little overall effect. This was largely due to the greater generation of 
turbulence and the venting process which predominantly occurred via the doorway and through the 
ignition-chamber vent opening. The use of a smaller vent in the ignition enclosure also altered the 
manner in which the explosion developed. A venting driven ‘jetting’ expanding flame, propagated into 
the adjoining enclosure and towards the far vent opening, generating the dominant pressure peak in 
these type of tests. 
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KA vent coefficient (cross-sectional 
area of the enclosure in the plane 
of the vent divided by the area of 
the vent opening) 
KA,I vent coefficient (ignition 
enclosure) 
KA,F vent coefficient (far enclosure) 
Pv Pressure peak due to vent opening 
(mbar) 
Pmax Maximum pressure (mbar) 
INTRODUCTION 
Accidental gas explosions inside enclosures are a recognised hazard in process industries but 
they are also common in residential buildings where natural gas or LPG are used for heating 
and/or cooking. Whilst in process plants pressure relief vents are specifically designed and 
installed to limit the enclosure damage, in homes a similar effect is achieved due to the presence 
of (weaker than the structure) doors and windows whose failure often protects the rest of primary 
building and its neighbours (although not always the case).  There are empirically based 
correlations for the prediction of overpressure and for vent sizing (e.g. EN 14994 [1]; NFPA 68 
[2] etc.), however these are limited in application to simple, compact enclosures. A typical 
process plant enclosure or a typical building has interconnected spaces which would potentially 
increase the flame acceleration considerably. Therefore, the simple guidelines and correlations, 
referred to above cannot be applied with any confidence to these situations for either design or 
post-incident investigation purposes. NFPA 68 [2] makes an attempt to account for turbulence 
generated by obstacles in the enclosure but it explicitly states that such approach is only  
applicable to cases where “the enclosure is isolated from possible flame jet ignition and 
pressures caused by a deflagration in an interconnected enclosure”. 
There have been very few large-scale experimental studies of the effects of interconnected rooms 
on gas explosions [3-7]. In this paper, continuing the work of Pedersen et al. [8], we present 
analysed data from a series of tests of full scale natural gas layer accumulation and ignition in 
two identical enclosures with an interconnected open door with low pressure vent relief from 
both enclosures.  
EXPERIMENTAL 
Sixteen large-scale vented explosion experiments were carried out in a twin enclosure explosion 
chamber (Figure 1). The chamber consisted of two 22 m
3
 (2.4 m x 3.6 m x 2.4 m approx.) 
enclosures that, in the tests we present here, were connected by an open doorway (1.98 m x 0.76 
m) halfway across the common boundary (Figure 2). Natural gas/air mixtures of 8, 10 and 12% 
concentration by volume, filling the upper half of both chambers (i.e. layer depth of 1.2 m) were 
ignited by an electric spark positioned at the centre of the rear wall of the left enclosure. The 
required natural gas/air mixtures were pre-mixed prior to admission into the explosion chamber 
and were introduced into each enclosure through a large diffuser located in the ceiling of each 
enclosure, thus allowing the formation of natural gas/air layers extending downwards from each 
enclosure ceiling. The fuel concentration was measured by withdrawing samples of the natural 
gas/air mixture at various heights in the enclosures through remote monitored sampling probes. 
The sampling probes were withdrawn from the enclosures prior to ignition. 
The pressures generated in the explosions were measured by eight piezoelectric pressure 
transducers located in the ceiling and front of the enclosures. 
Explosion relief was provided from low pressure vents on the upper half of each of the front 
enclosure walls (Figure 1), in varying combinations of 2.48, 1.49 or 0.74 m
2
 openings, 
corresponding to vent coefficients, KA, (defined as the cross-sectional area of the enclosure in the 
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plane of the vent divided by the area of the vent opening) of 2.4, 4 and 8 respectively. Video 
footage was used on the analysis of the flame position and pressure transducers were used to 
monitor the pressure changes in each chamber and externally whilst the corresponding pressure 
differences were used to estimate the mass flows and velocities through the openings. 
 
 
Figure 1. The explosion chamber.  
 
Ignition 
enclosure 
Far 
enclosure 
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Figure 2. Explosion chamber configuration (only the ignition & far enclosure spaces, with their 
connecting door open, the back doors closed, and the front openings used for vents were used in 
the tests reported here).  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
General 
A summary of the experimental considitions and test data is given in Table 1. The rate of 
pressure rise and flame speed, in vented explosions in empty enclosures, are directly proportional 
to the flame surface area. As the experiments described in this paper were all ignited at the centre 
of the rear wall of the left enclosure, a height, which is at the flammable mixture/air interface, the 
expanding flame front would have started to propagate in the shape of a quarter-sphere. 
Accordingly, the total surface area of the flame would have been significantly less than the case 
of an experiment involving a full volume of gas/air mixture (the full volume flame would have 
initially propagated in a hemispherical shape), and overpressures and flame speeds would be 
expected to be lower. This was found to be the case when compared to full volume tests to be 
reported in a further paper. 
Table 1. Summary of experimental conditions and test data.  
Original 
Test No. 
Gas Conc.  
(% v/v) 
KA PV 
(mbar) 
PMax 
(mbar) 
Ignition 
enclosure 
Far  
enclosure 
Ignition 
enclosure 
Far  
enclosure 
1 8 2.4 2.4 38 37 38 
2 8 2.4 2.4 39 39 39 
3 10 2.4 2.4 40 83 103 
4 10 2.4 2.4 41 82 85 
6 12 2.4 2.4 44 152 179 
7 12 2.4 2.4 44 76 83 
23 8 2.4 4l 44 55 62 
24 10 2.4 4l 46 83 90 
28 12 2.4 4l 44 117 145 
30 8 2.4 8 44 103 131 
32 12 2.4 8 46 110 152 
48 8 4r 2.4 51 69 69 
49 12 4r 2.4 51 117 110 
50 8 8 2.4 50 103 83 
51 10 8 2.4 62 324 234 
52 12 8 2.4 47 159 138 
 
In almost all of the experiments reported here, the explosion overpressure-time profiles displayed 
pressure peaks similar to that observed by Cooper et al. [9], Bauwens et al. [10, 11], Harrison and 
Eyre [12], Bimson et al. [13], van Wingerden [14, 15] and van Wingerden and Zeeuwen [16] in 
large-scale vented explosion experiments in a single compartment; that is, pressure peaks related 
to the opening of the vent, the onset of burnt gas venting, the external explosion, acoustic and 
hydrodynamic instabilities and maximum flame area were observed. Similar pressure peaks were 
also reported in small scale tests by Fakandu et al. [17]. 
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In general terms, three dominant pressure peaks were exhibited during the tests, not all of which 
were present in each test, but each produced the maximum peak in one or more tests. The first 
dominant pressure peak was always associated with the removal of one or both of the explosion 
relief vent panels (in either of the two enclosures) and its magnitude was equal to or slightly 
greater than the failure pressure of the vent panel. The pressure peak occurred, because initially, 
combustion was taking place in a totally confined enclosure and the expansion of the hot 
products of combustion generated a pressure rise. As soon as the vent covers failed, unburnt 
fuel/air mixture was allowed to escape through the openings causing the pressure to fall and 
giving rise to a pressure peak, labelled PV. The PV value reported in Table 1 is the lowest vent 
failure pressure of either of the vents. Interestingly, in many of the tests with a large vent opening 
in each enclosure (i.e. KA = 2.4), immediately after the PV pressure peak, the pressure dropped 
rapidly to below ambient and then immediately increased to form a second positive peak that was 
approximately the same value as the negative pressure trough (i.e. if the pressure dropped to -10 
mbar, it would then ‘bounce back’, with a compression wave, to form a peak of approximately 
+10 mbar [see Figure 3]. The negative pressure phase is caused by the momentum of the outflow 
of unburnt gas/air mixture, which ‘over-vents’ the explosion chamber and as the explosion is still 
in its early stages, the expanding flame front does not generate sufficient pressure to maintain a 
positive pressure within the chamber. The difference in pressure across the vent opening 
subsequently causes air and unburnt gas/air mixture to flow back into the vessel which creates 
turbulence. 
 
Figure 3. Overpressure-time profile for test no 7 (KA = 2.4). 
The second dominant peak was caused by the external explosion in a similar manner to that 
observed in a single compartment explosion (Cooper et al. [9], Bauwens et al. [10, 11], Harrison 
and Eyre [12], Bimson et al. [13], van Wingerden [14, 15]). 
The third dominant peak, which occurred in many of the explosion tests, and which was observed 
to produce the maximum pressure in many experiments, was found to be more complex in origin 
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and significantly more variable in its magnitude. The generation of this pressure peak was found 
to arise from the complex interaction of the combustion in each of the two compartments. 
The effects of large vents of equal size 
Figure 4 shows the overpressure-time profile for an experiment with a concentration of 8% (v/v) 
in each enclosure. The pressure measurements shown in the diagram were taken from pressure 
transducers located at the front of the enclosures. The pressure measurements taken from other 
transducers had similar profiles. As the natural gas/air mixture was moderately lean in 
concentration, there was an initial, relatively slow pressure rise up to approximately 580 ms after 
ignition, followed by a rapid drop in pressure to below ambient. It can be seen that the maximum 
pressure was generated in the first pressure peak and was recorded at 38 mbar. The video footage 
showed that both enclosure vents began to fail simultaneously at 540 ± 40 ms and were clear of 
the vent openings approximately 80 ms later. The pressure peak of 38 mbar at 580 ms therefore 
corresponds to the vent opening and onset of venting. The flame reaches the plane of the vent 
opening at 900 ± 40 ms but no significant pressure rise was measured inside the explosion 
chamber (usually seen shortly after an external explosion). However, bulk oscillations about 
ambient pressure start very shortly afterwards, at approximately 1 s, and occur at a frequency of 
approximately 60 Hz. The pressure oscillations recorded for each enclosure appear to have an 
opposite phase indicating that there is bulk movement between rooms via the doorway. In 
general terms, the pressure-time profile was similar to that expected of an explosion of a lean 
mixture in a single enclosure with a similar vent opening and failure pressure.  
 
Figure 4. Overpressure-time profile for test no 1 (KA = 2.4). 
The dominant pressure peak in the fuel lean layered tests generally corresponded to the failure of 
the vents and the onset of venting, with the external explosion being less influential. This was 
because the entrainment of air, as the unburnt fuel/air mixture was expelled from the vent 
openings, diluted the forming cloud to a point where it was either not flammable or the severity 
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of the external explosion was not sufficient to generate further overpressure within the explosion 
chamber. 
Figure 5 shows the overpressure-time history for an experiment involving a near stoichiometric 
concentration (10% concentration (v/v),  = 1.05) in each enclosure. In comparison with the 
overpressure-time history of test number 1, there were a number of significant differences 
observed. The initial pressure rise is considerably more rapid in this test because of the higher 
burning velocity associated with the near stoichiometric concentration. Observation of the video 
footage showed that both enclosure vents began to fail simultaneously at approximately 270 ± 40 
ms and were clear of the vent openings approximately 80 ms later. However, as a consequence of 
the vent opening, and in a similar manner to test number 1, a rapid pressure drop to below 
ambient pressure occurred, giving rise to a pressure peak of similar magnitude (approximately 40 
mbar) at 300 ms after ignition. Following this pressure drop to below ambient, a number of bulk 
gas oscillations occurred with flow reversal through the vent opening. However, these 
oscillations were interrupted by a sudden, very rapid pressure rise beginning at 460 ms, giving 
rise to a sharp pressure peak of 86 mbar at 480 ms.  
 
Figure 5. Overpressure-time profile for test no 4 (KA = 2.4). 
The video footage indicates that the flame reached the plane of both of the enclosure vent 
openings at 460 ms ± 40 ms. The sharp pressure peak therefore corresponds to the arrival of the 
flame at the vent openings and may be attributed to ignition of the flammable cloud expelled 
from the chamber during venting. In most of the tests observed during this series, there was a 
slight ‘dip’ in the overpressure-time profile just before the Pext peak. This slight reduction in 
overpressure was caused by the onset of burnt gas venting. 
Experiments involving fuel rich concentrations (12% v/v) in each enclosure produced 
overpressure-time profiles similar to that of the slightly rich of stoichiometric mixture test (test 
No. 4), with the maximum pressure peak occurring immediately after the flame front had reached 
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the vent opening. This indicates that the pressure peak was caused by the external explosion. Test 
No. 6 produced a maximum pressure peak of 179 mbar in the right enclosure, which was greater 
than the results of the near stoichiometric tests. The unburnt gas/air mixture entrains air as it is 
expelled through the vent opening and therefore stoichiometric mixtures are likely to be fuel lean 
when ignited by the explosion flame front and fuel rich mixtures are likely to be closer to 
stoichiometric, producing higher overpressures.  
In summary, for tests with large vents of equal size, the maximum overpressure peak for the 8% 
gas concentration tests corresponded to the failure of the vents, resulting in an overpressure of 39 
mbar, whilst both the 10% and 12% maximum peak pressure peaks were related to the external 
explosion, with maximum values measuring 103 and 179 mbar respectively. 
The effects of vent size differences in the adjoining enclosures and of gas concentration 
The effect of changing the size of the vent in the adjoining enclosures on maximum overpressure 
is given in Figure 6. The vent size difference is expressed in terms of the vent coefficient ratio - 
far enclosure over the ignition enclosure (KA,F/KA,I). This is effectively a ratio of the ignition 
chamber vent area divided by the far chamber vent area. So values under 1 indicate a vent in the 
ignition chamber that is smaller than that of the adjoining room.  
 
Figure 6. Maximum overpressure as a function of the vent area ratio between the two enclosures 
and the gas concentration.. 
The lowest overpressure for all mixtures occurred when the vent ratio was equal to 1, with 
effectively the larger vent being used in both vessels.  When either side vent was reduced in size 
the overpressure increased. On balance the tests suggest that the overpressure was greatest when 
the vent in the ignition chamber was smallest.  
As all vents were constructed of the same material, the larger vent had a lower failure pressure. 
Consequently, when the smaller vent was in the ignition chamber it would take higher pressures 
and longer time for the vent to break and since the larger vent was further away in the second 
chamber that would take a bit longer to open resulting overall in a higher Pv. It can be seen in 
Table 1 that the tests with smallest vent in the ignition chamber (last 3 tests in the Table) were 
associated with the highest Pv.  
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In the experiments where KA,F = 4, the vent could be fitted at either the left side or the right side 
of the front fascia panel. This was found to have no significant effect on either the maximum 
overpressure or the shape of the overpressure-time profile. 
It is interesting to note the effect of mixture strength of the gas layer.  In almost all but one of the 
tests the rich 12% mixture produced the highest overpressures. This can be attributed to the 
overall higher energy content of the 12% mixture which in a partially filled environment may 
result in diluted and therefore faster burning both within the enclosure and in the external 
explosion.  
In the test with smallest vent in the ignition chamber the near stoichiometric (10%) mixture 
produced the maximum overpressure (twice that of the 12% mixture) and this may attributed in 
longer near stoichiometric burning the ignition chamber due the higher Pv of the vent as 
discussed above.   
CONCLUSIONS 
In this series of layered natural gas explosions of variable gas concentration, in two 
interconnected both with large low inertia vents of approx. 1/2, 1/4, and 1/8
th
 of the far wall  area 
it was shown that the lowest overpressures (for all gas concentrations) occurred when the largest 
vent was used in both enclosures.  
If either chamber had a smaller vent, an increase in the maximum explosion overpressure was 
observed with the greatest effect being recorded when the smaller vent was fitted to the ignition 
chamber. In these cases a venting driven ‘jetting’ expanding flame, propagated into the adjoining 
enclosure and towards the far vent opening, generating the dominant pressure peak in these type 
of tests. 
The richer 12% gas concentration produced the highest overpressures in almost all tests and this 
was attributed to the fact that further mixing caused by the explosion induced flow internally and 
dilution externally will result in mixtures that are nearer to stoichiometric (than the other starting 
concentrations) both internally and externally and hence stronger burning.   
These observations have implications in the interpretation of dwelling gas explosion incidents. 
Fairly large fortuitous vents such as windows in both the initiating and adjoining rooms could 
result in less damage and the size of such vent in the ignition enclosure is particularly important. 
In partially filled enclosures, a rich layer is likely to result in more severe damage than a 
stoichiometric layer, however, it is indicated that if the vent in the initiating enclosure is small 
then a stoichiometric layer may be more damaging. 
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